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FOREWORD  
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 
JAMES D. COX* & STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ** 
To paraphrase Rob Jackson,1 this symposium issue brings together scholars 
of administrative law, financial regulation, and securities law to provide a rare—
and largely unprecedented—opportunity to consider how lessons drawn from 
each area should inform financial regulation. Several themes emerge. 
Perhaps the dominant theme is the significant divergence between financial 
regulation and other forms of regulation. Outside of the financial sector, 
accountability is the defining attribute of administrative law.2 This is 
exemplified by its notice-and-comment rulemaking, which seeks public input. In 
contrast, financial regulation is sometimes defined by the very independence of 
the regulators.3 The U.S. Federal Reserve (the Fed), for example, has budgetary 
autonomy from Congress. And its Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), 
which “may be the country’s most important agency” because it controls the 
U.S. money supply,4 exercises “remarkable” discretion.5 
This regulatory independence has justifications. Among other things, it 
“serves to improve the credibility of the Fed’s price stability mandate by 
insulating its decisionmaking from politics and, in particular, from the political 
pressure in favor of easy money during election cycles.”6 To some extent also, 
the regulatory independence may result from the fact that “[f]inancial 
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3, 2015 at 55. 
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and Balances, Public Engagement, and Other Innovations, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2015 at 
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PROBS., no. 3, 2015 at 157–58.  
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Barr, supra note 2, at 119. 
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regulation concerns activity that has very low exit costs.”7 
For example, “administrative law developed in the context of activities that 
either had no exit option or very high exit costs,” such as railroads that 
depended on tracks and rights of way.8 Similarly, environmental regulation 
“target[s] facilities that have high fixed costs and little ability to relocate in the 
short run, such as coal-burning power plants.”9 Because the externalities 
associated with these businesses are “chronic and cumulative,” regulators have 
the luxury of engaging in a “very elaborate, inclusive, deliberate, multistaged, 
heavily lawyered decision making process.”10 Financial regulation, in contrast, is 
different because a financial business “has very low or no exit costs.”11 Financial 
regulation thus “requires rapid decisionmaking [and] secrecy,” making it 
unrealistic to solicit “comments by interest groups, responses to comments, or 
lawyerly deliberation.”12 
Whatever the reason for the regulatory independence, the financial crisis 
has motivated Congress to try to reduce that independence.13 The Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd–Frank) Act, for example, 
limits the Fed’s power to bail out individual financial institutions.14 Perversely, 
however, that increases the risk that a systemically important financial firm will 
fail, transmitting failure to other financial institutions through their 
interinstitutional correlation.15 This confirms the importance of the warning that 
“[u]sing traditional mechanisms to make the Fed more politically accountable 
could substantially impede the Fed’s capacity to achieve the aims assigned to 
it.”16 
Some of the symposium-issue contributors argue that the perception of 
financial regulatory independence is merely superficial. Although hard law does 
not always require financial regulators to be accountable to the public, those 
regulators are nonetheless subject to “soft constraints.”17 There are at least two 
categories of constraints: principled norms, and the Fed chair’s reputational 
concerns.18 Soft constraints “have the capacity to meaningfully constrain agency 
 
 7.  Thomas W. Merrill, A Comment on Metzger and Zaring: The Quicksilver Problem, 78 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2015 at 189–90. 
 8.  Id. at 190. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 191. 
 12.  Id. at 192. 
 13.  Cf. Barr, supra note 2, at 128 (arguing that the financial crisis “sparked innovations in 
substantive financial regulation and administrative law designed to balance independence and 
accountability”). 
 14.  Dodd–Frank Act § 1101(a)(6) (amending § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act). 
 15.  Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: An Analytical Framework, 86 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1412 n. 238 (2011). 
 16.  Kathryn Judge, The Federal Reserve: A Study in Soft Constraints, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 3, 2015 at 66. 
 17.  Judge, supra note 16.   
 18.  Id. 
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action and to facilitate oversight and discourse.”19 Thus, an “internally 
developed tradition” based on norms makes the FOMC effectively accountable 
to the public, notwithstanding that it has no “externally imposed [legal] 
constraints.”20 
Perhaps of particular interest to scholars reading this symposium issue, the 
“quality and efficacy of [these] soft constraints depends on the effort that 
academics [among others] expend in the processes through which soft 
constraints are formed and enforced.”21 Among other things, this means that 
academics are essential to the process of establishing the principled norms that 
serve as soft constraints.22 (At least we’re essential to something!) 
This symposium issue also observes that, notwithstanding the divergence, 
there are many overlaps between financial and nonfinancial regulation, 
including areas of increasing convergence. The most observed overlap is cost-
benefit analysis (CBA), which increasingly is being used to assess the merits of 
financial regulation.23 
The symposium-issue contributors generally believe that CBA can be 
usefully applied to financial regulation, but they caution that regulators should 
be aware of its limitations. One contributor argues, for example, that, although 
in “the long term, [CBA] has the potential to improve [financial] regulatory 
outcomes substantially,” much more work is required to determine how and 
when to apply CBA to financial regulation before CBA “will be capable only of 
edifying, rather than generating, regulatory judgments.”24 Until that time, CBA 
should be treated as a “helpful but limited exercise[] in structured reasoning, 
not as [a] method[] to produce optimal regulatory changes.”25 Another 
contributor cautions that “whatever position one takes about the appropriate 
role of CBA in financial regulation, all should agree that the courts should play 
virtually no role in conducting or reviewing that analysis.”26 Yet another 
contributor warns that CBA may be, to some extent, incompatible with a 
financial regulator’s independence.27 
Another dominant theme of the symposium issue is complexity. This should 
not be a surprise; one of us has observed, for example, that complexity is the 
greatest financial-market regulatory challenge of the future.28 Complexity helps 
 
 19.  Id. at 95. 
 20.  Zaring, supra note 4, at 158. 
 21.  Judge, supra note 16, at 96. 
 22.  Cf. id. at 96 (observing that “principled norms can constrain only to the extent that there is an 
established principled norm”). 
 23.  Metzger, supra note 2, at 155 (observing that “[c]ross-pollination is evident in the context of” 
cost-benefit analysis). 
 24.  John C. Coates IV, Towards Better Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Essay on Regulatory 
Management, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2015 at 23. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Jackson, supra note 1, at 55. 
 27.  Ryan Bubb, The OIRA Model for Institutionalizing CBA of Financial Regulation, 78 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2015 at 47. 
 28.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 
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to explain why “Congress . . . tends to delegate to financial [regulatory] agencies 
significant, core questions regarding financial institution supervision, such as 
capital rules.”29 Complexity also explains why financial regulatory decisions may 
be inappropriate for judicial review: “Many financial regulatory decisions 
involve probabilistic judgments about risk, such as whether a bank’s failure 
might lead to financial panics, which are not readily subject to judicial second-
guessing.”30 
Because financial regulation “is a complex undertaking, . . . unintended 
consequences lurk behind ever well-meaning regulatory effort.”31 That 
highlights the danger of the “inevitability of politics” interfering with financial 
regulation, which one symposium contributor believes to be the “important 
lesson [that] administrative law holds for financial regulation.”32 This foreword 
has already observed an example of such a danger, resulting from Congress’s 
attempt to try to reduce financial regulatory independence.33 
To address complexity, one symposium contributor argues for incremental 
financial regulation.34 Such an approach can help financial regulators better 
assess “the likely consequences of the regulations.”35 Evidence of the 
consequences of an incremental administrative rule thus can “inform[] the 
agency how to next proceed, including tweaking of its past initiatives.”36 This 
type of an approach, for example, has 
worked well for the SEC [Securities and Exchange Commission] when a securities 
statute or regulation announces a regulatory principle. Enforcement and experience 
gained under such a principle can inform the development of safe harbors. Thus, 
adoption and refinement of safe harbors are iterative, as is the more informal SEC 
noaction letter process. It would also be useful throughout the process to demonstrate 
how experience gained has enabled the agency, consistent with its presumed expertise, 
to adapt its rules so as to reduce their burdens on the regulated while increasing their 
expected benefits.37 
Complexity can also help to explain why financial regulatory agencies 
sometimes “seem structured to invite [regulatory capture], with a number of 
agencies being given authority over narrow industry slices.”38 This better 
enables specialization, which is one approach by which lower paid financial 
 
212–13 (2009); Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage 
Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 405 (2008). 
 29.  Barr, supra note 2, at 120.  
 30.  Id. Cf. supra note 22 and accompanying text (observing that courts should play virtually no 
role in conducting or reviewing cost-benefit analysis of financial regulation).  
 31.  James D. Cox, Iterative Regulation of Securities Markets After Business Roundtable: A 
Principles-Based Approach, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2015 at 44. 
 32.  Metzger, supra note 2, at 155. 
 33.  See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text (arguing that Congress’s legislating limits on the 
Fed’s power to bail out individual financial institutions perversely increases systemic risk). 
 34.  Cox, supra note 31, at 25. 
 35.  Id. at 45. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Metzger, supra note 2, at 130. 
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regulators can keep up with their much higher paid industry counterparts.39 
Complexity also helps to explain the fact that “[m]uch financial regulation 
displays a collaborative approach, with greater reliance on information sharing 
and partnership between regulators and those they regulate.”40 Absent these 
and other types of measures intended to reduce the information asymmetry 
between the members of the financial industry and their regulators, regulators 
may be unable to “fully understand, and thus to effectively monitor and 
regulate, financial innovations that might create systemic externalities.”41 
This brief foreword attempts merely to begin to introduce the reader to the 
richness of the symposium issue. The issue, however, speaks for itself. The 
issue’s contributors are the leaders in their fields, and no summary could ever 
do justice to their actual writings. 
 
 
 39.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Intrinsic Imbalance: The Impact of Income Disparity on Financial 
Regulation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2015 at 114–15 (also demonstrating at least a two-to-
one income disparity between financial industry employees and their regulatory counterparts).  
 40.  Metzger, supra note 2, at 130. 
 41.  Schwarcz, supra note 39, at 97. 
